Tuesday, September 16, 2008

How George W Bush stared down his generals in Iraq

George W Bush trusted his generals in the early years of the Iraq War. But in 2006, he smelled failure with their main goals of Arabisation and troop withdrawals, and set in train an eventual escalation, bypassing the usual chain of command. So far, the US President appears to have been right. Bob Woodward reveals how the surge came about and why it has been succeeding, as Bush faces his last months in office

HALFWAY through the sixth year of his US presidency and more than three years into the Iraq War, George W. Bush stood on a veranda of the American embassy compound in Baghdad. He had flown through the night for a surprise visit to the new Iraqi Prime Minister. It was June 13, 2006. With so much at stake in Iraq, where success or failure had become the core of his legacy, Bush had been anxious to meet the man he had, in many ways, been waiting for since the invasion.

It was now evening. A hazy sunset had descended over the sweltering, violent capital. The President stepped aside for a private conversation with US Army General George W. Casey Jr, the 57-year-old commander of the 150,000 U.S. forces in the country. A 5-foot-8 (173cm), four-star general with wire-rim glasses, closely cropped graying hair and a soft voice, Casey had been the commander in Iraq for two years.

As American military units rotated in and out, rarely serving more than a year, Casey had remained the one constant, seeing it all, trying to understand - and end - this maddening war in this maddening land.

Recently, there had been some positive news in Iraq. A week earlier, US forces had killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the man Osama bin Laden had declared the “Prince of Al-Qa'ida in Iraq” and the terrorist organisation's in-country operational commander. And the previous month, after three elections and months of delay, Nouri al-Maliki finally had taken office as the country's first permanent Prime Minister. Now, in the warm Baghdad dusk, the President and the general lit thin cigars.

“We have to win,” Bush insisted, repeating his public and private mantra. Casey had heard the President's line dozens of times. “I'm with you,” he replied. “I understand that. But to win, we have to draw down. We have to bring our force levels down to ones that are sustainable both for them and for us.”

Casey felt that the Iraqis, a proud people and resistant to the Western occupation, needed to take over. The large, visible US force was ultimately a sign of disrespect. Worse, the prolonged occupation was making the Iraqis dependent. Each time additional US troops arrived, they soon seemed indispensable. The Iraqis needed to take back their country and their self-respect, so central to Arab culture. They needed to fight their own war and run their own government; they were doing neither.

Casey studied Bush's face, now wrinkled and showing its 59 years, the right eye slightly more closed than the left under graying, full eyebrows.

The general had pushed for a drawdown for two years. And while the President had always approved the strategy, he no longer seemed to buy Casey's argument. “I know I've got work to do to convince you of that,” the general said, “but I firmly believe that.”

Bush looked sceptical. “I need to do a better job explaining to you” why winning means getting out, Casey said. “You do,” Bush replied.

Casey had long concluded that one big problem with the war was the President himself. He later told a colleague in private that he had the impression that Bush reflected the “radical wing of the Republican Party that kept saying, ‘Kill the bastards! Kill the bastards! And you'll succeed.’” Since the beginning, the President had viewed the war in conventional terms, repeatedly asking how many of the various enemies had been captured or killed.

The real battle, Casey believed, was to prepare the Iraqis to protect and govern themselves.

This is an edited extract from The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008, by Bob Woodward, published by Simon & Schuster,price to come. Read the full extract in The Weekend Australian tomorrow. (Petraeus, officially commanding general, Multi-National Force - Iraq, later this month assumes a promotion as commander of the US Central Command, which includes the Middle East and Central Asia.)

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