How George W Bush stared down his generals in Iraq

George W Bush trusted his generals in the early years of the Iraq War. But in 2006, he smelled failure with their main goals of Arabisation and troop withdrawals, and set in train an eventual escalation, bypassing the usual chain of command. So far, the US President appears to have been right. Bob Woodward reveals how the surge came about and why it has been succeeding, as Bush faces his last months in office

HALFWAY through the sixth year of his US presidency and more than three years into the Iraq War, George W. Bush stood on a veranda of the American embassy compound in Baghdad. He had flown through the night for a surprise visit to the new Iraqi Prime Minister. It was June 13, 2006. With so much at stake in Iraq, where success or failure had become the core of his legacy, Bush had been anxious to meet the man he had, in many ways, been waiting for since the invasion.

It was now evening. A hazy sunset had descended over the sweltering, violent capital. The President stepped aside for a private conversation with US Army General George W. Casey Jr, the 57-year-old commander of the 150,000 U.S. forces in the country. A 5-foot-8 (173cm), four-star general with wire-rim glasses, closely cropped graying hair and a soft voice, Casey had been the commander in Iraq for two years.

As American military units rotated in and out, rarely serving more than a year, Casey had remained the one constant, seeing it all, trying to understand - and end - this maddening war in this maddening land.

Recently, there had been some positive news in Iraq. A week earlier, US forces had killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the man Osama bin Laden had declared the “Prince of Al-Qa'ida in Iraq” and the terrorist organisation's in-country operational commander. And the previous month, after three elections and months of delay, Nouri al-Maliki finally had taken office as the country's first permanent Prime Minister. Now, in the warm Baghdad dusk, the President and the general lit thin cigars.

“We have to win,” Bush insisted, repeating his public and private mantra. Casey had heard the President's line dozens of times. “I'm with you,” he replied. “I understand that. But to win, we have to draw down. We have to bring our force levels down to ones that are sustainable both for them and for us.”

Casey felt that the Iraqis, a proud people and resistant to the Western occupation, needed to take over. The large, visible US force was ultimately a sign of disrespect. Worse, the prolonged occupation was making the Iraqis dependent. Each time additional US troops arrived, they soon seemed indispensable. The Iraqis needed to take back their country and their self-respect, so central to Arab culture. They needed to fight their own war and run their own government; they were doing neither.

Casey studied Bush's face, now wrinkled and showing its 59 years, the right eye slightly more closed than the left under graying, full eyebrows.

The general had pushed for a drawdown for two years. And while the President had always approved the strategy, he no longer seemed to buy Casey's argument. “I know I've got work to do to convince you of that,” the general said, “but I firmly believe that.”

Bush looked sceptical. “I need to do a better job explaining to you” why winning means getting out, Casey said. “You do,” Bush replied.

Casey had long concluded that one big problem with the war was the President himself. He later told a colleague in private that he had the impression that Bush reflected the “radical wing of the Republican Party that kept saying, ‘Kill the bastards! Kill the bastards! And you'll succeed.’” Since the beginning, the President had viewed the war in conventional terms, repeatedly asking how many of the various enemies had been captured or killed.

The real battle, Casey believed, was to prepare the Iraqis to protect and govern themselves.

This is an edited extract from The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008, by Bob Woodward, published by Simon & Schuster,price to come. Read the full extract in The Weekend Australian tomorrow. (Petraeus, officially commanding general, Multi-National Force - Iraq, later this month assumes a promotion as commander of the US Central Command, which includes the Middle East and Central Asia.)

Bush considering 8,000 troop cuts in Iraq

The top U.S. general in Iraq is recommending nearly 8,000 troop cuts in Iraq because of the improving situation there, a source close to the process has told CNN.

President Bush is considering Gen. David Petraeus' recommendation, which the official said is for a reduction of "well over 7,500 personnel," with the number including combat and support troops.

Some units would leave Iraq over the next five months as they complete their missions. But the first possible significant reduction -- an army brigade combat team -- would leave without replacement early next year, said the official, and that would free a brigade to be rotated to Afghanistan instead of Iraq.

Petraeus gave his recommendation to Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen, who have passed it and other recommendations along to the president.

A reduction in U.S. troops in Iraq would free up personnel for deployment to Afghanistan, a move urged by many commanders. The Taliban has stepped up its fight in that country, posing a challenge for the 33,000 U.S. troops deployed there.

The White House will not comment on the details of the Iraq recommendations. Spokeswoman Dana Perino said only that Bush "has received the assessment and recommendation from the Pentagon and he is considering his options."

The president is expected to make an announcement on troop levels next week, the same time Gates and Mullen are to testify before the House Armed Services Committee about Iraq and Afghanistan.

There are 146,000 U.S. troops in Iraq.

Iraq and the United States are working to seal a security agreement that would set down a framework to withdraw troops.

In deciding on troop cuts, officials must weigh the need for sufficient U.S. military presence to help Iraq build its army and the significant sentiment there for U.S. and coalition troops to withdraw swiftly.

U.S. and Iraqi negotiators have been looking at a proposal calling for a complete U.S. military withdrawal by the end of 2011, and a deadline of June 30, 2009, to end the presence of U.S. troops in cities and towns.

Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell confirmed that Gates and Mullen made their recommendations to Bush on Wednesday, but gave no details.

"I can tell you that all these leaders are fundamentally in agreement on how we should proceed in Iraq," he said of Gates, Mullen, Petraeus, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and acting Central Command chief Gen. Martin Dempsey.

"Of course, now it is up to the commander-in-chief to decide the way ahead," Morrell said.

Officials said senior military leaders agree that the soonest troop levels could be significantly reduced would be early in 2009, when a 3,500-strong brigade from the 10th Mountain Division is scheduled to deploy to Iraq to replace a brigade leaving in mid-January.

Pentagon officials say that would free another brigade combat team to arrive in Afghanistan in mid-February.

The Army has identified units that could be available for Afghanistan, but it would take two to three months from the time the decision is made to assemble all the weaponry and equipment they need and ship them and the troops to Afghanistan, two Army officials told CNN.

The officials said the troops would not need extensive additional training to switch from Iraq to Afghanistan, especially those earmarked to train Afghan forces.

The increase in fighting in Afghanistan contrasts with the dramatic drop in violence across Iraq, where U.S. military is confident that it will continue to make strides.

The military transferred security control to Iraqis this week in the country's Anbar province, a Sunni Arab region once dominated by insurgents and now a bastion of the Awakening Councils, or Sons of Iraq, U.S.-backed groups that help with some security duties.

The military said it plans to transfer management of the Awakening Councils to the Iraqi government next month.

"The government of Iraq and coalition forces have agreed in principle to transfer all 100,000 Sons of Iraq," Maj. John Hall told CNN. "The transfer will start with the Baghdad province, with the other provinces following at a later date."

Under the security agreement still being negotiated, the Iraqi government could ask Americans to extend the tentative deadlines if it sees the necessity of doing so. A joint Iraqi-U.S. committee would then help define the duration and number of forces that would be needed and regularly assess the security situation on the ground.

White House spied on Iraq's leader, Bob Woodward says in book

The Bush administration has conducted an extensive spying operation on Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki, his staff and others in his government, according to a new book by Washington Post editor and author Bob Woodward.

"We know everything he says," according to one of multiple sources Woodward cites about the practice in "The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008," scheduled for publication by Simon & Schuster on Monday.

The book also says the U.S. troop "surge" of 2007, in which President Bush sent nearly 30,000 additional U.S. forces to Iraq, was not the primary factor behind the steep drop in violence there during the last 16 months.

Rather, Woodward reports, "groundbreaking" covert techniques, beginning in 2007, enabled U.S. military and intelligence officials to locate and kill insurgent leaders and key individuals in extremist groups.

Woodward does not disclose the code names of the covert programs or provide much detail about them, saying in the book that White House and other officials cited national security concerns in asking him to withhold specifics.

Overall, Woodward writes, four factors combined to reduce the violence: the covert operations; the influx of troops; the agreement by militant cleric Muqtada Sadr to rein in his powerful Mahdi Army militia; and the so-called Anbar Awakening, in which tens of thousands of Sunnis turned against the insurgent group Al Qaeda in Iraq and allied with U.S. forces.

The 487-page book is Woodward's fourth to examine the inner debates of the Bush administration and its handling of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The book is based on more than 150 interviews with the president's national security team, senior deputies and other key players in the intelligence, diplomatic and military communities. Woodward conducted two on-the-record interviews with Bush in May.

It portrays an administration split by dissent as the situation in Iraq deteriorated during the summer and early fall of 2006. Publicly, Bush said U.S. forces were "winning"; privately, he came to believe that the military's long-term strategy of training Iraqi security forces and handing over responsibility to the new Iraqi government was failing.

In October 2006, the book says, Bush asked Stephen Hadley, his national security advisor, to lead a closely guarded review of the Iraq war. That first assessment did not include anyone from the military, however, and proceeded secretly because of White House fears that news coverage of a review might damage Republican chances in the midterm congressional elections.

According to Woodward, the president maintained an odd detachment from the reviews of war policy during this period, turning much of the process over to Hadley. "Let's cut to the chase," Bush told Woodward. "Hadley drove a lot of this."

Responding to a question about how the White House settled on a troop surge of five brigades after the military leadership in Washington had reluctantly said it could provide two, Bush said: "OK, I don't know this. I'm not in these meetings, you'll be happy to hear, because I got other things to do."

The book presents an evolving picture of the president's decision making. On the one hand, it portrays Bush as detached, tentative and slow to react to the escalating violence in Iraq; on the other, after he decided that a surge was required, he is shown acting with focus and determination to move ahead with his plan in the face of strong resistance from his top military advisors.